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The World Intellectual Property Organization's (WIPO)
Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic
Resources, Traditional Knowledge, and Folklore (IGC) is currently
engaged in text-based negotiations to develop an international legal
instrument, or set of instruments, that will effectively protect
traditional knowledge, traditional cultural expressions, and genetic
resources. Yet, the people who will arguably be most affected
by the ultimate instrument(s)-indigenous peoples and local
communities-are not able to fully participate in these negotiations.
Instead, WIPO deems them "Observers." They cannot formally present
proposals, amendments, or motions, and cannot vote at IGC sessions.
Thus, their limited influence implicates questions of equity,
sovereignty, and global justice. Claiming to recognize this dilemma,
WIPO has created mechanisms to increase these groups' attendance
and participation. However, many argue that these mechanisms are
insufficient and that WIPO's final product will lack legitimacy if
indigenous peoples and local communities do not play a genuine role in
the process. This Note explores how the IGC's current organizational
structure limits indigenous peoples' and local communities' influence
and presents ways for the IGC to more fully incorporate these groups
and their ideas while maintaining a member-based organizational
structure.
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The legal issues surrounding traditional knowledge are unlike
any in intellectual property law.' This is because they span copyright,
trademark, trade secret, and patent law, and involve questions about
sovereignty, self-determination, and human rights.2 Conventional
intellectual property regimes do not currently protect traditional
knowledge, which has ancient roots and is often informally and orally
1. See JANE ANDERSON, DUKE UNIV. SCHOOL OF LAW CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN, INDIGENOUS/TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE & INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 2 (2010),
available at http://web.law.duke.edu/cspd/pdf/ip-indigenous-traditionalknowledge.pdf.
2. See id. at 2-3.
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transmitted. 3 Instead, indigenous peoples' and local communities'
norms are often the only standards protecting traditional knowledge,
leaving it vulnerable to misappropriation.
4
Nevertheless, protecting traditional knowledge internationally
is a relatively recent concern. 5  In 2000, the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO), a United Nations (UN) body,
established the Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual
Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge, and Folklore
(IGC) to study the issues surrounding this knowledge and to present
recommendations to WIPO's General Assembly.6 Almost fifteen years
later, the IGC still struggles to define terms, build consensus, and
create an instrument or set of instruments to effectively protect
traditional knowledge.
7
Looming over these criticisms is the greatest criticism of all:
indigenous peoples and local communities-the individuals with the
greatest stake in the IGC's undertaking-are not able to adequately
participate in the negotiations that will define their international
intellectual property rights.8  Although WIPO's charter permits
3. See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG. [WIPO], THE WORLD INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY ORGANIZATION TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE DOCUMENTATION TOOLKIT 16 (Nov. 1, 2012)
[hereinafter DOCUMENTATION TOOLKIT], available at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/tk/en/
documents/pdf/tk-toolkit.pdf.
4. See Stephen R. Munzer & Kal Raustiala, The Uneasy Case for Intellectual Property
Rights in Traditional Knowledge, 27 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 37, 39 (2009). Misappropriation
is defined in Article 1 of the revised Objectives and Principles of the IGC. See WIPO Secretariat,
Intergovernmental Comm. on Intellectual Prop. & Genetic Res., Traditional Knowledge &
Folklore, The Protection of Traditional Knowledge: Revised Objectives and Principles,
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/8/5 (Apr. 8, 2005), available at http://www.wipo.intedocs/mdocs/tk/en/
wipo-grtkf ic 8/wipo-grtkf ic 8_5.doc. An illustrative example of misappropriation: In the
1990s, when two researchers attempted to patent the use of turmeric to heal wounds, the Council
of Scientific & Industrial Research (CSIR) from New Delhi, India, successfully challenged the
patent by demonstrating that turmeric had been used for healing wounds for thousands of years.
See Traditional Knowledge and Intellectual Property: The Case of Turmeric, THE LIFEINTELECT
BLOG (Oct. 24, 2013), http://lifeintelect.com/blog/2013/l0/24/traditional-knowledge-and.
intellectual-property-case-of-turmeric; cf. Sumathi Subbiah, Note, Reaping What They Sow: The
Basmati Rice Controversy and Strategies for Protecting Traditional Knowledge, 27 B.C. INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 529 (2004).
5. See WIPO, BACKGROUND BRIEF NO. 2: THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMISSION ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND GENETIC RESOURCES, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE & FOLKLORE 1
[hereinafter BACKGROUND BRIEF No. 2], available at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/tk/en/
documents/pdf/backgroundbriefs-e-nx2-print.pdf.
6. See id.
7. See Catherine Saez, Frustrations Show at Slow Progress on Protection of
Traditional Knowledge at WIPO, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WATCH (Apr. 21, 2012, 5:53 PM),
http://www.ip-watch.org/2012/04/21/frustrations-show-at-slow-progress-on-protection-of-
traditional-knowledge-at-wipo.
8. See Gale Courey Toensing, World Intellectual Property Organization Blasted for
'Misappropriation' of Indigenous Knowledge, Resources, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. [Vol. 16:3:629
indigenous groups 9 and the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
that claim to represent them to attend the IGC sessions as
"observers,"10 they cannot vote, nor can they formally present
proposals, amendments, or motions.11 Apart from these institutional
barriers, these groups also confront challenges that stem from limited
resources and political marginalization.1 2 As a result, their limited
influence implicates questions of fairness, equity, and global justice.1 3
WIPO uses various strategies, such as sponsoring indigenous
groups to attend IGC sessions and pre-session panel presentations, to
include indigenous groups in the IGC process to some degree.1 4 Also,
WIPO member states arguably represent the interests of the
indigenous groups within their borders.1 5 Yet, these groups and
advocates criticize WIPO for not considering their perspectives or
ignoring their limited input.16
This Note examines the IGC's current structure to determine
what role indigenous groups and the organizations and states that
NETWORK.COM (May 16, 2012), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2012/05/16/world-
intellectual-property-organization-blasted-misappropriation-indigenous-knowledge.
9. The IGC's efforts cover traditional knowledge belonging to both "indigenous peoples"
and "local communities." Practical Guide for Observers, http://www.wipo.int/export/
sites/www/tk/en/igc/pdf/observers-practical-guide.pdf (last visited February 17, 2014). Their
definitions can be found in Part I.A.2 of this Note. See infra Part I.A.2. For simplicity and
brevity, this Note uses the term "indigenous groups" to refer to both "indigenous peoples" and
"local communities."
10. See Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, signed
July 14, 1967 (as amended Sept. 28, 1979), 828 U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://www.wipo.int/
treaties/enltext.jsp?fileid=283854; Observers, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/members/en/
admissionlobservers.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2014) [hereinafter Observers].
11. Practical Guide for Observers, supra note 9; cf. WIPO Secretariat, Note on Existing
Mechanisms for Participation of Observers in the Work of the WIPO Intergovernmental
Commission on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore
1 (Oct. 10, 2011) [hereinafter Note on Existing Mechanisms], available at http://www.wipo.int/
export/sites/www/tk/enligc/pdf/note-igc participation.pdf. (identifying then-existing practices for
enhancing observer participation).
12. See United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Submission
from the OHCHR to the World Intellectual Property Office Secretariat to the Intergovernmental
Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore
(Nov. 30, 2011) [hereinafter Submission from the OHCHR], available at http://www.wipo.int/
export/sites/www/tk/en/documents/pdf/ochr-comments on observer participation.pdf; Nancy
Kremers, Speaking with a Forked Tongue in the Global Debate on Traditional Knowledge and
Genetic Resources: Are U.S. Intellectual Property Law and Policy Really Aimed at Meaningful
Protection for Native American Cultures?, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1, 71
(2004).
13. See DUNCAN MATTHEWS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
DEVELOPMENT: THE ROLE OF NGOs AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 2-3 (2011).
14. See CHRISTOPH B. GRABER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN INDIGENOUS CULTURAL
HERITAGE: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 192 (2012).
15. See infra Part II.
16. See Saez, supra note 7; Toensing, supra note 8.
632
APPROPRIATION WITHOUT REPRESENTATION
purport to represent them play in creating the legal instruments that
will affect their claims to their traditional knowledge. 17  Part I
explains the debate surrounding how to define the relevant terms, the
structure of WIPO and the IGC, and reasons why the participation of
indigenous groups matters.18 Part II explores indigenous groups'
current representation in the IGC, evaluates how these groups
contribute to the negotiations, poses questions about their varying
incentives, and surveys proposed solutions to better incorporate
indigenous groups' perspectives. 19 Part III presents solutions to strike
a balance between the desire to include indigenous groups in the IGC
process and the reality of likely needing to maintain WIPO's structure
as a member state-based organization. 20 Solutions are not lacking;
action is.21
I. DEFINING TERMS AND THE EVOLUTION OF WIPO'S IGC
Despite WIPO's efforts to provide meaningful intellectual
property protections through the creation of the IGC and its work, the
IGC's structure remains a barrier to indigenous groups' influence on
the final instrument(s). 22 The lack of a common vocabulary regarding
who will be affected by the IGC's work and the kind of knowledge to be
protected further complicates discussions.
23
A. Defining Terms
One of the primary obstacles facing WIPO is how to define
important terms like "indigenous," "knowledge," and "traditional,"
among others.24 The terms in this field defy simple definition.
25
Tensions exist because these terms implicate the historical, political,
and cultural differences that persist between and within indigenous
groups and the international community.26 They therefore serve as a
locus of fervent debate.
27
17. See infra Parts 1I-11.
18. See infra Part I.
19. See infra Part II.
20. See infra Part III.
21. See infra Part II.E.
22. See infra Part I.D.
23. See infra Part I.A.
24. See ANDERSON, supra note 1, at 3-4.
25. See id. at 3.
26. See id. at 4.
27. See id. at 3-4.
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1. Areas of Interest: TK, TCE, and GR
The IGC developed three distinct categories to help manage its
domain since each area of interest presents its own set of challenges.2
8
The three categories are: (1) traditional knowledge (TK),29 (2)
traditional cultural expressions and folklore (TCE), and (3) genetic
resources (GR). 30 Nevertheless, Justin Hughes argues "all three
involve rights, remuneration, and respect for inputs to innovation that
are typically taken for granted."
3' 1
As an initial matter, "traditional knowledge," as a catchall
phrase, describes all knowledge that prior generations of indigenous
groups and local communities have passed down through traditional
means. 32 It forms part of the traditional lifestyle of the communities
that act as its custodian. 33 In this sense, traditional knowledge often
forms part of the community's cultural or spiritual identity, which
makes it difficult to protect under current intellectual property
systems. 34 When used in this way, traditional knowledge's definition
is elastic and can have varied meanings.
35
28. See id. at 4-5.
29. In this Note, "TK' refers to traditional knowledge in its more technical, narrow
sense, whereas "traditional knowledge" refers to broader use of the term.
30. See ANDERSON, supra note 1, at 4-5.
31. Justin Hughes, Traditional Knowledge, Cultural Expression, and the Siren's Call of
Property, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1215, 1218 (2012).
32. See id. at 1217; see also Frequently Asked Questions, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/
tk/en/resources/faqs.html#a2 (last visited Jan. 25, 2014) [hereinafter Frequently Asked
Questions] (emphasis added) (defining traditional knowledge). Traditional knowledge is often
used interchangeably with the term "indigenous knowledge" when conceived as a broad category,
but traditional knowledge is preferred because it does not limit who can benefit from a developed
property system. See CHIDI OGUAMANAM, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, PLANT BIODIVERSITY, AND TRADITIONAL MEDICINE 20-26 (2006). When
considered a general category encompassing all other types of knowledge, traditional knowledge
is sometimes deployed as a foil to "Western science." See Peter Drahos & Susy Frankel,
Indigenous Peoples' Innovation and Intellectual Property: The Issues 1, 11 (Victoria Univ. of
Wellington Legal Research Papers, Paper No. 36/2012, 2012). Scholars like Chidi Oguamanam
argue that scholars who exaggerate differences between traditional knowledge and Western
science tend to fail to take into account the constantly changing nature of knowledge and the
frequent hybridization of existing knowledge. See OGUAMANAM, supra, at 15-18.
33. See ANDERSON, supra note 1, at 4; Hughes, supra note 31, at 1217-18; Frequently
Asked Questions, supra note 32.
34. WIPO, BACKGROUND BRIEF No. 1: TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE & INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY 1 [hereinafter BACKGROUND BRIEF No. 1], available at http://www.wipo.int/export/
sites/www/tklenresources/pdfltk.Ibriefl.pdf. "[Ilt is not easily protected by the current
intellectual property system, which typically grants protection for a limited period to inventions
and original works by named individuals or companies." Id.
35. See OGUAMANAM, supra note 32, at 16-17, 26; Drahos & Frankel, supra note 32, at
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In recent IGC debates, WIPO members use TK more narrowly
to describe a smaller subset of technologies-typically diagnostic,
therapeutic, horticultural, predictive, or technologies related to
engineering with natural materials. 36  Examples include: "[(a)]
knowledge about traditional medicines; [(b)] traditional hunting or
fishing techniques; [(c)] knowledge about animal migration patterns;
[and (d)] knowledge about water management."37 WIPO classifies TK
as a type of knowledge that might otherwise be protected under
patent, trademark, or trade secret law.
38
TCE, in contrast to TK, includes intellectual property such as
traditional music, dances, stories, rituals, insignia, arts and crafts,
sculptural forms, and architectural forms. 39  Viewed through a
Western lens, these expressions prompt copyright and trademark
questions. 40 In practice, conventional intellectual property systems
sometimes protect TCE.
41
The third area of interest is GR, which WIPO defines as
"genetic material of actual or potential value."42 Although intellectual
property law generally would not protect naturally occurring genetic
resources, inventions and plant varieties based on or developed using
genetic resources with traditional knowledge may be patentable.
43
While these categories make discussions more manageable,
they do not necessarily coincide with the way indigenous groups
understand and discuss their knowledge systems within their
communities. 44  Indigenous peoples "tend to employ the political
discourse of human rights: rights to land, territory, and resources;
rights to full disclosure and prior informed consent; rights to cultural
integrity and customary practices; and rights to equitable
benefit-sharing and control over access to traditional resources." 45
36. See Hughes, supra note 31, at 1217.
37. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 32.
38. Traditional Knowledge, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/tk (last visited Jan. 17,
2014). But see TSHIMANGA KONGOLO, UNSETTLED INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
ISSUES 42-44 (2008) (explaining why TK would be prevented from being included in the
conventional IP system).
39. See Hughes, supra note 31, at 1216-17.
40. See id. at 1218.
41. See BACKGROUND BRIEF NO. 1, supra note 34, at 3.
42. Genetic Resources, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/tklenlgenetic (last visited Jan. 17,
2014).
43. See id. The IGC's work is said to complement the Convention on Biological Diversity
(CBD) and its Nagoya Protocol, and the United Nation's Food and Agricultural Organization's
(FAO) International Treaty on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture. See BACKGROUND
BRIEF No. 1, supra note 34, at 3.
44. See ANDERSON, supra note 1, at 4; Drahos & Frankel, supra note 32, at 8.
45. Miriam Latorre Quinn, Note, Protection for Indigenous Knowledge: An International
Law Analysis, 14 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 287, 293 (2001) (quoting Rosemary J. Coombe, Intellectual
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Many indigenous peoples do not attach importance to definitions;
instead, they understand their knowledge through the relationships
created by the possession of that knowledge, rather than the features
of that knowledge. 46  "Accordingly, [they] may view intellectual
property rights as an obstacle rather than an aid to maintaining their
knowledge. 47 To add to the confusion, traditional-knowledge holders
are not necessarily indigenous peoples.
48
2. "Indigenous Peoples"
According to the United Nations Permanent Forum on
Indigenous Issues (UNPFII), there are more than 370 million
indigenous people in approximately ninety countries worldwide.
49
Nevertheless, the UN has decided not to adopt a specific definition for
"indigenous peoples." 50 Governments agree it is neither desirable nor
necessary to establish a universal definition. 51
Property, Human Rights & Sovereignty: New Dilemmas in International Law Posed by the
Recognition of Indigenous Knowledge and the Conservation of Biodiversity, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 59, 79 (1998)); see also MATTHEWS, supra note 13, at 71 ("For indigenous peoples
and local communities, traditional knowledge constitutes the very foundation of cultural
heritage, cultural identity, and social integrity . .. and should not be viewed primarily from a
commercial perspective.").
46. See Drahos & Frankel, supra note 32, at 9-10.
47. Quinn, supra note 45, at 293 (quoting Rosemary J. Coombe, Intellectual Property,
Human Rights & Sovereignty: New Dilemmas in International Law Posed by the Recognition of
Indigenous Knowledge and the Conservation of Biodiversity, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 59, 79
(1998)). Some scholars discourage defining what "traditional knowledge" means. See
OGUAMANAM, supra note 32, at 15.
48. See Drahos & Frankel, supra note 32, at 11; supra Part I.A.3.
49. See History of Indigenous Peoples and the International System,
UNITED NATIONS PERMANENT FORUM ON INDIGENOUS ISSUES, http://social.un.org/index/
IndigenousPeoples/AboutUsMembers/History.aspx (last visited Jan. 25, 2014).
50. See Indigenous Peoples, Indigenous Voices, UNITED NATIONS
PERMANENT FORUM ON INDIGENOUS ISSUES, available at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/
documents/5sessionfactsheetl.pdf (last visited on Jan. 25, 2014); Secretariat of the Permanent
Forum on Indigenous Issues, United Nations Dept. of Econ. & Social Affairs, Div. for Social Pol'y
& Dev., The Concept of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc. PFII/2004/WS.1/3 (Jan. 19-21, 2004)





no definition of indigenous peoples has been defined). The United Nations emphasizes that the
lack of formal definitions has not been crucial to the United Nation's successes or failures,
referring to other groups who have been left undefined, such as "minorities" and "peoples." See
id. at 3-4. In the United Nations Declaration of Indigenous Rights, there is no clear indication of
who is protected under the Declaration; however, Article 33 states in part, "[i]ndigenous peoples
have the right to determine their own identity or membership in accordance with their customs
and traditions." See United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res.
61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007) [hereinafter United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
636
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For practical purposes, however, the UN and many indigenous
peoples endorse the Martinez Cobo Report, which provides an
expansive definition of the term "indigenous communities, peoples and
nations":
Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical
continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their
territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now
prevailing on those territories, or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant
sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future
generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their
continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social
institutions and legal system.
52
The report presents factors such as ancestral land occupation,
common ancestry, culture, and language to define the term "historical
continuity.'' 53 It also identifies indigenous individuals as those who




The IGC's work also covers knowledge belonging to "local
communities," as WIPO designates the bearers of traditional
knowledge as "indigenous peoples and local communities.
'55 WIPO
defines local communities as "the human population in a distinct
ecological area who depend directly on its biodiversity and ecosystem
goods and services for all or part of their livelihood and who have
developed or acquired traditional knowledge as a result of this
dependence, including farmers, fisherfolk, pastoralists, forest dwellers
Peoples], available at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS-en.pdf. The United
Nations also recognizes that the terms "indigenous" and "tribal" are used as synonyms when the
peoples concerned identify themselves under the indigenous agenda, even though there are tribal
peoples who are not "indigenous" in the literal sense but are nevertheless living in the same
situation. See The Concept of Indigenous Peoples, supra, at 3.
51. See The Concept of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 50, at 3. But see Social
and Human Sciences: Nation-State, UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL
ORGANIZATION [UNESCO], http://www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-sciences/themes/
international-migration/glossary/nation-state (defining "nation-state").
52. The Concept of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 50, at 2 & n.4. Jose R. Martinez Cobo,
the Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities, provided this definition in his well-known Study on the Problem of Discrimination
against Indigenous Populations. See id. at 1.
53. Id. at 2.
54. Id.
55. See generally WIPO, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES PORTAL,
http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/indigenous (last visited Jan. 17, 2014). This phrase is borrowed from
the CBD and the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues. Glossary, WIPO,
http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/resources/glossary.html#26 [hereinafter Glossary] (emphasis added)
(last visited Jan. 17, 2014) (defining indigenous and local communities).
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and others."56 Local communities can be of indigenous descent but are
not necessarily descendants of indigenous populations. 57 As with
"traditional knowledge" and "indigenous peoples," the term "local
communities" is riddled with vagueness, further complicating the
IGC's efforts to define critical terms.
58
B. WIPO to Develop Legal Instrument(s)
Historically, the international community's political focus did
not prioritize traditional knowledge; rather, it encouraged indigenous
self-government and incidental political rights.59 Not until the 1980s
did the international community begin to emphasize indigenous
worldviews regarding information systems.6 0 Traditional knowledge
and intellectual property law intersected when (1) the international
community recognized the economic value of traditional knowledge;
(2) developing countries increased their focus on international
intellectual property rights; and (3) indigenous groups created global
political networks.
6 1
Prior to WIPO, two international legal instruments, the
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), sought
to protect traditional knowledge to some extent. 62 Although the CBD
recognized the importance of traditional knowledge and was a binding
instrument focused on conservation and sustainability, it failed to
cover traditional knowledge as its own category of intellectual
property, and it arguably facilitated the exploitation and
commercialization of traditional knowledge.6 3 Similarly, although
TRIPS expanded intellectual property protection through
international trade mechanisms, many activists criticized it for failing
to protect the underlying raw materials.64
56. Id.
57. See Secretariat of the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues for the Expert
Workshop on the Disaggregation of Data, United Nations Dept. of Econ. & Social Affairs, Div. for
Social Pol'y & Dev., The Concept of Local Communities, U.N. Doc. PFII20041WS.1/3/Add.1 (Jan.
19-21, 2004), available at http://www.cbd.intldoc/meetings/tk/aheg-lcr-Ol/information/aheg-lcr-
01-inf-01-en.pdf.
58. See supra Part I.A. 1-2.
59. See OGUAMANAM, supra note 32, at 3.
60. See id. at 4.
61. See Drahos & Frankel, supra note 32, at 1-2.
62. See id. at 7-9.
63. See OGUAMANAM, supra note 32, at 4-5; Kremers, supra note 12, at 45.
64. See Hughes, supra note 31, at 1234-35.
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When CBD and TRIPS failed to complement each other to
effectuate a complete framework to protect traditional knowledge,
65
WIPO, a UN agency dedicated to stimulating innovation through the
use and protection of intellectual property, 66 emerged as the body
focused on providing a comprehensive legal instrument or set of
instruments to promote a system of protective rights for indigenous
groups' TK, TCE, and GR.
6 7
Fifty-one nations launched WIPO in 1967,68 and WIPO
presently has 186 member states.69 According to WIPO, states
represent all interested parties within their borders.
70  WIPO
maintains a "one state, one vote" rule, but WIPO members avoid
voting.71  Committee work is generally consensus based, so action
committees do not act unless all states agree. 72 Currently, WIPO is
the only international organization examining these issues from a
technical standpoint.
73
WIPO's most important decision-making body is the General
Assembly, which the WIPO Secretariat (Secretariat) leads.
74
Participants include the heads of national or regional intellectual
property offices. 75  At this level, ambassadors often direct their
65. See Drahos & Frankel, supra note 32, at 7-9.
66. See What is WIPO?, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en (last visited Jan. 18,
2014). Implicit in WIPO's stated objectives is the assumption that protecting intellectual
property is an appropriate and worthwhile goal that will ultimately spur innovation. See id.; cf.
Debora J. Halbert, The World Intellectual Property Organization: Past, Present and Future, 54 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 253, 263 (2007) ("It is exactly this assumption that was of concern to
developing countries involved in the Stockholm Convention.").
67. See ANDERSON, supra note 1, at 2 ("[WIPO] is the primary international body
through which discussions and debates have been filtered.").
68. Halbert, supra note 66, at 265.
69. Member States, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/members/en (last visited Jan. 18, 2014).
Membership is open to any member of the Berne Union or Paris Union. Id.; Coenraad Visser,
The Policy-Making Dynamics in Intergovernmental Organizations: A Comment on the Remarks of
Geoffrey Yu, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1457, 1458 (2007).
70. Id.
71. Id.; Geoffrey Yu, The Structure and Process of Negotiations at the World Intellectual
Property Organization, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1445, 1452 (2007) ("[W]e try to avoid voting ...
[and instead go with] consensus building.").
72. See Robin Gross, World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), GISWATCH.ORG,
available at http://www.gswatch.org/sites/default/files/gisw-wipo-O.pdf (last visited Jan. 18,
2014).
73. See Kremers, supra note 12, at 47-48.
74. See Yu, supra note 71, at 1447; see Gross, supra note 72, at 1. The Secretariat has
"enormous" power to influence and define the organization's objectives. Id. In addition to the
General Assembly, WIPO also has two other governing bodies: the WIPO Conference Committee
and the WIPO Coordination Committee. See Decision-Making and Negotiating Bodies, WIPO,
http://www.wipo.int/about-wipolen/decisionbodies.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2014).
75. See Yu, supra note 71, at 1448.
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delegations from behind the scenes. 76  The General Assembly
considers all issues from the committees' work at once. 77
WIPO also has Standing Committees and Permanent
Committees. 78 The Standing Committees do the preparatory work for
any new international intellectual property instrument, 79 while
Permanent Committees are known as the "Committees of Experts."80
The IGC is one of WIPO's Permanent Committees and is the assigned
forum for discussing issues concerning TK, TCE, and GR.s1
C. Development and Evolution of the IGC
The IGC's establishment in 2000 stemmed from two WIPO
pursuits.8 2 In the late 1990s, concerns about TK and GR made their
way to WIPO's Standing Committee on Patents when member states
raised concerns while preparing for the WIPO Diplomatic Conference
for the adoption of the new Patent Law Treaty.8 3 Meanwhile, WIPO's
Secretariat requested and pursued a series of fact-finding missions in
the late 1990s to analyze the needs and expectations of indigenous
groups and government representatives regarding traditional
knowledge protection.8 4 Participants met with indigenous groups and
local communities in twenty-eight countries.85 At the end of these
missions, WIPO concluded that traditional knowledge had been per se
excluded from intellectual property protection and that even if some
forms had been protected, current enforcement regimes did not
sufficiently protect this knowledge.86
76. See id. at 1449. The Deputy Director General of WIPO, Geoffrey Yu, described these
interactions as a kind of tit-for-tat, where individuals negotiate: "If I give you a certain thing in
this area, I expect movement in the other area." Id. at 1450.
77. See id. at 1449.
78. Decision-Making and Negotiating Bodies, supra note 74.
79. Visser, supra note 69, at 1458-59.
80. Decision-Making and Governing Bodies, supra note 74. There are currently four
Permanent Committees: the Program and Budget Committee (PBC); the Committee on
Development and Intellectual Property (CDIP); the Intergovernmental Committee on
Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (IGC); and the
Advisory Committee on Enforcement (ACE). Id.
81. See id.
82. See BACKGROUND BRIEF No. 2, supra note 5, at 1-2.
83. See id. at 2.
84. See id.; Quinn, supra note 45, at 293. The missions included investigative pursuits,
regional consultations, workshops, and roundtables concerning GR, TCE, and TK. BACKGROUND
BRIEF No. 2, supra note 5, at 2; MATTHEWS, supra note 13, at 70.
85. MATTHEWS, supra note 13, at 70.
86. See Quinn, supra note 45, at 305. In April 2001, the findings of these missions were
published in the report, "Intellectual Property Needs Expectations of Traditional Knowledge
Holders: Report on Fact-finding Missions on Intellectual Property and Traditional Knowledge."
See MATTFHEWS, supra note 13, at 70.
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WIPO member states recognized the crosscutting effects TK,
TCE, and GR had on conventional intellectual property rights when
they created the IGC.8 7 During this time, discussions centered on how
these segments would fit into existing international and national
intellectual property systems and whether sui generis forms of
protection were better suited for dealing with new concerns.
88
The IGC's initial mandate was to study and make
recommendations to the General Assembly concerning intellectual
property issues arising from (1) access and benefit-sharing pertaining
to GR; (2) the protection of TK, innovation, and creativity, whether or
not associated with any GR; and (3) the protection of expressions of
folklore, including handicrafts.8 9 At the IGC's inception, its mandate
did not define its ultimate goal, nor did it articulate whether the final
product would be a legal instrument or set of legal instruments
recommending certain action or a ratifiable treaty.90
The IGC's current mandate is to engage in text-based
negotiations for an international legal instrument that would
effectively protect GR, TK, and TCE. 91 Nevertheless, as of 2013, it is
still unclear whether the final instrument will bind member states
and by what means WIPO could enforce it.92
D. The Current Structure of the IGC
Practically, IGC participants include governmental
representatives from recognized nation states, bureaucrats from
relevant international agencies, intergovernmental organizations,
NGO representatives, and select indigenous representatives who have
87. CTR. INT'L ENVTL L. [CIEL], THE GAP BETWEEN INDIGENOUS PEOPLES' DEMANDS
AND WIPO's FRAMEWORK ON TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 2 (2007) [hereinafter THE GAP
BETWEEN], http://www.ciel.org/Publications/WIPOGap-SeptO7.pdf.
88. See id. at 3. Academic debates continue to rage on about whether an intellectual
property regime is really the best-suited mechanism to protect traditional knowledge. See
ANDERSON, supra note 1, at 27-40.
89. See Kremers, supra note 12, at 51.
90. See BACKGROUND BRIEF No. 1, supra note 34, at 1; BACKGROUND BRIEF NO. 2, supra
note 5, at 1.
91. See Assemblies of Member States of WIPO 40th Sess. (20th Ordinary Sess.),
Matters Concerning the Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic
Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, Agenda Item 31: Decision (Sept. 26 to Oct. 5,
2011), available at http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/documents/pdf/decision-assemblies_.2011.pdf;
ANDERSON, supra note 1, at 2; Differences Plague WIPO Negotiations on Traditional Knowledge,
INT'L CENTRE FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV., 16 (16) BRIDGES WEEKLY TRADE NEWS DIGEST
(Apr. 25, 2012), available at http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridgesweekly/131986.
92. See WIPO Assemblies Approve IGC Roadmap, INT'L CENTRE FOR TRADE &
SUSTAINABLE DEv., 12 (17) BRIDGES TRADE BIORES (Oct. 15, 2012), http://ictsd.org/
i/newslbiores/147217.
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received permission to participate in some capacity. 93 Attendees meet
in Geneva, Switzerland, for sessions, each lasting about ten days,
several times per year to discuss each one of the subareas
individually.94 Because the IGC is member-state driven,95 however,
government representatives are the only participants that have the
power to offer proposals, amendments, and motions. 96 They are also
the only participants entitled to vote. 97
Beyond member-state participants, the IGC accredits
organizations to be ad hoc observers through its fast-track
accreditation process and allows WIPO-accredited permanent
observers to attend and participate in a limited way. 98 Accredited
observers cannot make or vote on proposals, amendments, or
motions.99 Evidence from 2011 suggests that over half of these
accredited observers are indigenous peoples and local communities,
while the other half are international NGOs or industry groups
involved with broader intellectual property issues. 100
93. See ANDERSON, supra note 1, at 5; see also Participating in the IGC, WIPO,
http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/igc/participation.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2014) (providing link to list
of accredited observers, which include intergovernmental organizations and NGOs).
94. See MATTHEWS, supra note 13, at 74; Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual
Property & Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (IGC), WIPO,
http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/topic.jsp?group-id=110 (last visited Jan. 18, 2014) [hereinafter
Meetings].
95. See Kremers, supra note 12, at 55. At the most recent IGC session, 110 member
states were in attendance. IGC 23 Update: Negotiators Advance on Text on Intellectual
Property and Genetic Resources, WIPO (Feb. 11, 2013), http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/
news/igc/2013/news_0003.html.
96. See Yu, supra note 71, at 1448 ("proposals can only come from governments");
Practical Guide for Observers, supra note 9, at 1 ('The right to submit proposals, amendments
and motions and the right to vote are exclusive rights of Members States at the IGC.").
97. See Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization art. 6,
signed July 14, 2967 (as amended Sept. 28, 1979), 828 U.N.T.S. 3, available at
http://www.wipo.intftreaties/en/text.jsp?file-id=283854.
98. See GRABER ET AL., supra note 14, at 192; Practical Guide for Observers, supra note
9, at 1; Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 32; infra Part II.C. The difference between
"permanent observers" and "ad-hoc observers" is that WIPO Permanent Observers are accredited
by the Assemblies of the Member States of WIPO and they are entitled to attend and participate
in sessions of all WIPO's Committees and in the annual General Assembly, while ad-hoc
observers accredited to the IGC may, however, participate only in IGC sessions. See Frequently
Asked Questions - Accreditation to the Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property
and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (IGC), WIPO, http://www.wipo.int
exportlsites/www/tklenligc/pdflaccreditation faq.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2014) [hereinafter
Accreditation FAQ]; see infra Part II.C. WIPO distinguishes between intergovernmental
organizations and NGOs in their permanent-observer application process. See Observers, supra
note 10. But see Participating in the IGC, supra note 93 (illustrating one accreditation form for
observer applicants).
99. See Practical Guide for Observers, supra note 9, at 1.
100. See MATMHEWS, supra note 13, at 71.
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Although most, if not all, of the substantive participatory rights
extend to member states only, 10 1 WIPO allows accredited observers to
substantively contribute to the IGC in some ways. 10 2 The IGC Chair
generally allows observers to intervene during sessions on any agenda
item and to make drafting proposals for member-states' collective
consideration; such proposals are incorporated into the discussion as
long as one member state serves as a sponsor. 10 3 However, the IGC
Chair has the power to limit the intervention of observers for
relevance or timing reasons.'0 4 WIPO also incorporates observers'
ideas into session reports, which WIPO publishes after each session. 105
Although these informal accommodations prevent accredited observers
from being completely shut out of the process, indigenous groups and
their advocates argue they effectively are.
10 6
II. INDIGENOUS GROUPS' STRUGGLES FOR REPRESENTATION IN THE IGC
Although the IGC has made significant efforts to enhance
participation by indigenous groups, critics continue to reiterate their
concerns and reservations regarding the IGC's work. 07 They claim
that, so far, the IGC has developed documents without the
broad-based participation of indigenous groups. 08 They also argue
that working documents do not satisfactorily reflect indigenous
groups' perspectives. 10 9 If this is the case, the question remains as to
what the best options are, in terms of feasibility and satisfaction, for
101. See Note on Existing Mechanisms, supra note 11, at 1; see also Kremers, supra note
12, at 55 ("Currently, [WIPO's] work is necessarily constrained to reflect the interests and policy
goals of national governments, which in many cases may not reflect the interests of indigenous
people. One of the problems the JGC has faced in its work on TKGRF is that WIPO's
organizational structure is not conducive to participation by non-state actors.").
102. See Note on Existing Mechanisms, supra note 11, at 1-2.
103. See id. at 1.
104. See WIPO Secretariat, Draft Study on the Participation of Observers in the Work of
the Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional
Knowledge and Folklore 7 [hereinafter Draft Study on Participation], available at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/tklen/wipo-grtkf ic 20/wipo-grtkf ic_20_7-annexl.pdf.
105. See Note on Existing Mechanisms, supra note 11, at 1.
106. See infra Part II.D.
107. See infra Part II.D.
108. THE GAP BETWEEN, supra note 87, at 2; see also MATTHEWS, supra note 13, at 72
(explaining how there is a perception that the intellectual property system has allowed for the
misappropriation of traditional knowledge and has not been as successful at providing
indigenous and other local communities with remedies).
109. See THE GAP BETWEEN, supra note 87, at 4.
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modifying the way the IGC operates to incorporate indigenous groups'
perspectives in a meaningful way.110
A. Why Participation Matters
There are important reasons to support facilitating and
increasing indigenous groups' participation in the IGC. 111 These
include, but are not limited to: ensuring the legitimacy of the IGC's
final instruments,11 2 upholding human rights and development
principles, 113 and aligning WIPO's work with UN declarations. 114
1. The Legitimacy of the Document
Many scholars and indigenous groups stress that the IGC's
final instrument(s) will lack legitimacy if they do not incorporate and
reflect indigenous communities' perspectives.1 15 They argue that the
IGC will create an agreement or set of agreements that will affect
indigenous groups' rights without duly considering their
perspectives.1 1 6  Even though the member states may be
well-intentioned and intelligent contributors to the dialogue, they
typically lack either first-hand knowledge or cultural and customary
legal context, if not both. 7 Without the substantive participation of
indigenous groups, the instrument(s) produced will not include these
important elements-elements that outsiders cannot easily perceive or
protect without guidance. 118
Without incorporating this first-hand experience, the solutions
may prove inappropriate and run counter to the way many indigenous
peoples conceive of their intellectual property. 11 9 The more indigenous
groups participate in debates about the challenges they face when
110. Cf. id. at 10-12. (positing reasons why the IGC's work has not succeeded in fully
reflecting the demands of indigenous and local communities).
111. See infra Part II.A.
112. See infra Part II.A.1.
113. See infra Part II.A.2.
114. See infra Part II.A.2.
115. See, e.g., Kremers, supra note 12, at 57; Catherine Saez, Indigenous Peoples Walk
Out of WIPO Committee on Genetic Resources, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WATCH (Feb. 22, 2012,
12:57 PM) [hereinafter Indigenous Peoples Walk Out], http://www.ip-watch.org/2012/02/
22/indigenous-peoples-walk-out-of-wipo-committee-on-genetic-resources.
116. See Kremers, supra note 12, at 57; Indigenous Peoples Walk Out, supra note 115.





traditional knowledge intersects with intellectual property law, the
more likely it is that the IGC will create an appropriate policy.120
2. The Human Rights Perspective
Indigenous groups' involvement and representation in the IGC
is also a human rights issue. 121 Since indigenous groups tend to be
among the poorest and most disadvantaged in the world, they often
lack the infrastructure and raw resources to effectively engage with
their national governments, let alone an international body like the
IGC.1 22
Critics of the IGC's current framework assert that indigenous
groups' lack of participation infringes on their right to
self-determination. 123 They call for adherence to the principle of free,
prior, and informed consent (FPIC), which has been acknowledged by
various documents within the field of international human rights
law. 124 In this context, this principle would call for a process free from
coercion, intimidation, and manipulation. 121 It would only recognize
consent if indigenous groups had sufficient notice and appropriate
access to the relevant information and then provided consent through
120. See ANDERSON, supra note 1, at 7.
121. See LAURENCE R. HELFER & GRAEME W. AUSTIN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: MAPPING THE GLOBAL INTERFACE 49 (2011); Madhavi Sunder, The Invention of
Traditional Knowledge, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 97, 105-06 (2007).
122. See Hughes, supra note 31, at 1256; Sunder, supra note 121, at 112.
123. See S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 79 (1996);
OGUAMANAM, supra note 32, at 154; Mary Ellen Turpel, Indigenous Peoples' Rights of Political
Participation and Self-Determination: Recent International Legal Developments and the
Continuing Struggle for Recognition, 25 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 579, 591-92 (1992); S. JAMES ANAYA,
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 79 (1996); OGUAMANAM, supra note 32, at 154.
Self-determination can be thought of as a principle requiring that every culturally and
historically distinct people have the right to choose its political status by democratic means,
under international supervision, and with international support. See Turpel, supra, at 592.
124. See Grand Council of the Crees (Eeyou Istchee), Comments to Note on Existing
Mechanisms for Participation of Observers in the Work of the WIPO Intergovernmental
Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore
(Nov. 30, 2011), available at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/tk/en/documents/pdf/
grand council of the creescomment on observer-participation.pdf. This principle has been
acknowledged in various documents within the field of international human-rights law. One
notable example is Article 6 of the International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention (No. 169)
Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, which intends to establish
mechanisms for free participation at all levels of decision-making in elective institutions and
administrative bodies responsible for policies and programs that concern indigenous groups. See
Secretariat of the U.N. Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, U.N. Workshop on Engaging the
Marginalized: Partnerships Between Indigenous Peoples, Governments, and Civil Society,
Background Paper: Engaging Indigenous Peoples in Governance Processes: International Legal
and Policy Frameworks for Engagement 3 (Aug. 15, 2005) [hereinafter Engaging Indigenous
Peoples], http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/engagement-background-en.pdf.
125. See Engaging Indigenous Peoples, supra note 124, at 11.
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freely chosen representatives or customary methods. 126 At a WIPO
General Assembly meeting in October 2012, an indigenous
representative from the International Committee for the Indians of
America (Incomindios) urged WIPO to apply this principle: "It is not
acceptable to reduce our rights to the lowest common denominator for
Indigenous Peoples while promoting broader 'States rights' standards
that allow States and other parties to take our property without our
free, prior and informed consent."
127
Further, gaining intellectual property rights is connected to
development because these rights relate to increasing efficiency and
expanding central freedoms for indigenous groups and local
communities. 128 Madhavi Sunder argues that the failure to recognize
ownership could impede access to essential goods such as educational
materials and life-saving medicines by diminishing material wealth
and the capability to live a full life. 129 Indigenous groups will be better
able to fortify their destinies if they are involved in the IGC process. 130
3. Congruity with UN Principles
The UN supports the FPIC principle and has worked for and
with indigenous groups to increase their participation in international
fora.1 31 For instance, the UNPFII develops and advocates for policies
that acknowledge indigenous groups' human rights and call for their
full and effective participation in all matters that concern them. 132
Further, the UN Development Program's (UNDP) overall objective is
to engage indigenous peoples and foster an enabling environment
where they can participate in all levels of decision-making, have their
socio-political systems co-exist, and integrate their perspectives into
the UNDP's work.133 Most importantly, the UN issued its Declaration
of Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2007, which articulated a
commitment to indigenous groups' right to self-determination and
made a strong statement about their sovereignty relative to nation
126. See id. at 4.
127. Ambassador Ronald Barnes, Statement at the 50th General Assembly of WIPO:
Incomindios, Article 27 IGC on TK, GR and TCEs (Oct. 4, 2012) (emphasis added) (transcript
available at http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/wp-content/uploads/2012/1O/WIPO-GA-50-
Incomindios-statement.pdf).
128. See Sunder, supra note 121, at 121.
129. See id.
130. See Draft Study on Participation, supra note 104, at 5.
131. See Turpel, supra note 123, at 580.
132. See Engaging Indigenous Peoples, supra note 124, at 4-5; see also UNITED NATIONS
PERMANENT FORUM ON INDIGENOUS ISSUES, 12TH SESSION RECOMMENDATIONS FOR UN
AGENCIES (Recommendation 53).
133. See id., Recommendation 25.
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states.134  These actions indicate that WIPO's decision-making
processes should mirror its UN counterparts and should adhere to the
UN's stated principles on these issues.
135
B. Representation of Indigenous and Local Communities' Interests
Member states, NGOs, and certain indigenous groups,
arguably represent indigenous groups' interests in the IGC. 136 Yet,
there are reasons to question whether they are true and effective
representatives. 137
1. Member States
According to the WIPO Secretariat: "The IGC is and will
remain an intergovernmental process in which decisions are taken by
the Member States of WIPO."138 Even so, the IGC recognizes the need
to directly incorporate indigenous groups and encourages member
states to include representatives from these groups in their
delegations. 139 In practice, however, few delegations include these
groups. 140 As a result, there is charged discourse about whether
member states strive to incorporate indigenous perspectives or merely
work to enhance their own interests.141
Some countries arguably advocate for indigenous groups.
142
Typically, these are countries where dominant indigenous cultures
with strong central administrations can ensure that their
governments are protecting them. 143 In many of these countries,
134. See History of Indigenous Peoples and the International System, supra note 49;
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 50. Regarding
intellectual property protection and self-determination, Article 31 of the Declaration states:
"Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain, control, protect and develop their cultural
heritage, traditional knowledge and traditional cultural expressions, as well as the
manifestations of their sciences, technologies and cultures, including human and genetic
resources, seeds, medicines, knowledge of the properties of fauna and flora, oral traditions,
literatures, designs, sports and traditional games and visual and performing arts. They also have
the right to maintain, control, protect and develop their intellectual property over such cultural
heritage, traditional knowledge, and traditional cultural expressions." Id.
135. Cf. Turpel, supra note 123, at 580-81 (illustrating an example where mirroring UN
principles may actually result in negative consequences).
136. See infra Part II.B.
137. See infra Part II.B.
138. Draft Study on Participation, supra note 104, at 5.
139. See id. at 2-3; Kremers, supra note 12, at 55.
140. See Draft Study on Participation, supra note 104, at 3.
141. See MATHEWS, supra note 13, at 73; Hughes, supra note 31, at 1263; Kremers,
supra note 12, at 55.
142. See Hughes, supra note 31, at 1260.
143. See id. at 1263.
20141 647
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
domestic laws recognize indigenous rights and these national
governments seek to use their experiences to assist in developing an
international framework. 144 For instance, Australia, Brazil, Mexico,
New Zealand, and the United States generally support the interests of
indigenous groups at IGC sessions. 145
Other countries do not advocate on behalf of these populations,
for many possible reasons. 146 For one, indigenous groups are often
among the most socially marginalized and least politically powerful in
any given nation. 147 Further, the relationships between national
governments and indigenous groups may be strained because of past
land disputes, conflicts about self-determination, and the application
of customary law; this may be especially true in developing nations. 148
Lastly, national governments may perceive indigenous groups'
advocacy as a "radical assault" on the Western intellectual property
tradition that encourages innovation and idea cultivation rather than
stewardship.
149
In contrast, some countries may be unable to advocate on the
behalf of these groups.1 50 For instance, developing countries may be at
a disadvantage in the IGC, even if they want to represent indigenous
interests.151 Developed nations are more likely to have intellectual
property experts, developed networks of indigenous groups with
lobbying power, domestic laws to guide their positions, and the means
to travel to weeklong IGC sessions.1 52  Although NGOs help
developing countries understand pertinent issues in many
144. See id. at 1260-61.
145. See id. at 1260.
146. Cf. MATTHEWS, supra note 13, at 73 (explaining how many indigenous groups have
tense relationships with their national governments); Kremers, supra note 12, at 57 (discussing
how indigenous communities tend to not to be politically powerful and lack financial resources).
147. See MATTHEWS, supra note 13, at 73; Kremers, supra note 12, at 57.
148. See MATTHEWS, supra note 13, at 73.
149. Sunder, supra note 121, at 106.
150. See generally Duncan Matthews, The Role of International NGOs in the Intellectual
Property Policy-Making and Norm-setting Activities of Multilateral Institutions, 82 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1369, 1371-73 (2007) [hereinafter Matthews, The Role] (explaining how international
NGOs try to enhance the capacity of developing nations to negotiate in multinational forums
because developing nations "do not receive detailed advice, support, or feedback" from their
capital cities and are "unlikely to be experts on intellectual property rights").
151. See id.
152. See id. For example, the Republic of Kazakhstan lacks mechanisms or practices
regarding the legal protection of traditional knowledge, which makes it difficult for them to
contribute to the dialogue. See COMMITTEE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OF
THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN (2011)
[hereinafter COMMENTS FROM KAZAKHSTAN], available at http://www.wipo.intlexport/sites/www/
tk/endocuments/pdf/kazakhstancomments on observer participation.pdf.
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instances, 15 3 this assistance cannot compensate for the lack of
expertise developing countries may have about the complex issues
indigenous groups face.
154
Other countries pay lip service to the IGC and their indigenous
constituents when they advocate for traditional knowledge
protection. 155 They may do so in the hopes of having their national
government reap the benefits of that protection rather than the
indigenous and local communities themselves. 15 6 These countries may
even have laws that claim to protect this knowledge domestically but
use the laws to extract money from developed countries without
passing that money along to the indigenous groups as the intended
beneficiaries. 15 7  Fortunately, many nations are using the IGC
framework to fight such misappropriation. 158
Finally, another subset of countries may prefer to address
these issues domestically. 159 Nancy Kremers, the current Intellectual
Property attach6 for the US embassy in China,160 claims that certain
developed countries would prefer a focus on national solutions, rather
than an international solution, because they believe the issues
indigenous groups face in other countries are not of issue to their
indigenous populations.1 61 To the contrary, spokespeople from these
domestic indigenous groups claim that they do face the same
difficulties and remain frustrated that the IGC has not confronted the
larger philosophical and legal questions regarding traditional
knowledge.
62
153. See Matthews, The Role, supra note 150, at 1371-72.
154. See id. at 1381.
155. Cf. Hughes, supra note 31, at 1260-61 (describing the phenomenon of
developing-country elites extracting wealth from its people and stating, '"The troubling
experience of some developing countries with extractive resources and others with cash crops
should be instructive because GRTKF share characteristics with each.").
156. See id.
157. See id. at 1261; Email from Participant in WIPO IGC Negotiations from Developed
Country to author (Feb. 10, 2013, 11:53 CST) (on file with author) [hereinafter Email from
Participant in WIPO IGCI.
158. See Hughes, supra note 31, at 1260; Email from Participant in WIPO IGC, supra
note 157.
159. Cf. Kremers, supra note 12, at 61-62 (stating that the United States' "policy
position" at WIPO is that the legal treatment of traditional knowledge should be determined
domestically); THE GAP BETWEEN, supra note 87, at 12 (describing the myriad of types of
relationships that may exist between national governments and indigenous groups at the
national level and its impact on international participation).
160. See Business, Consulate General of the United States Wuhan, China,
http://wuhan.usembassy-china.org.cn/business.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2014).
161. See Kremers, supra note 12, at 61-62 (referencing the United States).
162. See id. at 71.
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2. Accredited Observers: NGOs and Indigenous Groups
The number of non-state actors that have received observer
accreditation has consistently increased over the last ten years. 163
Presently, NGOs are numerically strong, but only a fraction of these
groups directly represent the interests of indigenous peoples. 164
The IGC does not distinguish between NGOs and the
organizations that are directly accountable to indigenous groups when
it classifies or accredits an observer. 65 Some of these organizations
advocate for the protection of traditional knowledge; 66 however, there
are doubts about their abilities to productively contribute to the
dialogue and their conflicting motives. 167 Further, only a small
percentage of these groups intervene in the process, which may
undermine the representativeness of those who do participate.168
Kremers and others argue that NGOs are effectively shut out
of negotiations because of WIPO's organizational structure.1 69 NGOs
must lobby state actors to act to have any influence because NGOs are
not allowed to vote or make proposals and have only limited
opportunities to participate in discussions.1 70  It is notable that
163. Cf. id. at 56 (stating that there has been an a steady increase in observer
applications); MATTHEWS, supra note 13, at 71 (stating that no group has ever been denied
accreditation).
164. See Email from Participant in WIPO IGC, supra note 157; cf. Participating in the
IGC, supra note 93 (providing the list of accredited organizations). Although WIPO and the IGC
accredit both NGOs and intergovernmental organizations, this Note focuses on NGOs because
they represent the majority of WIPO and the IGC accredited observers. Cf. Participating in the
JGC, supra note 93 (providing lists of accredited organizations in WIPO); Accredited observers to
the WIPO Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic
Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (IGC), WIPO, available at http://www.wipo.int/
export/sites/www/tklenigc/pdfigc-observers.pdf (providing list of IGC's accredited observers).
165. See Draft Study on Participation, supra note 104, at 4.
166. OGUAMANAM, supra note 32, at 153. But see Note by Secretariat, Intergovernmental
Comm. on Intellectual Prop. & Genetic Res., Traditional Knowledge & Folklore, Revision of
Participation Procedures 1 (Dec. 5, 2011) (prepared and submitted by
the Tupaj Amaru Indigenous Movement (Bolivia)), available at http://www.wipo.int/export/
sites/www/tklenligc/pdf/igc observer-participation.pdf ("[T]he majority of observers are
representatives of pharmaceutical companies, biotechnology industries and patent attorneys,
anthropologists and powerful lobbies which defend interests alien to indigenous peoples.").
167. See Matthews, The Role, supra note 150, at 1381 ("[W]hether the participation of
international NGOs ... influences policy outcomes is questionable.").
168. See THE GAP BETWEEN, supra note 87, at 4; Email from Participant in WIPO IGC,
supra note 157. For example, no major Native American tribe or umbrella organization for them
has ever attended an IGC meeting. See id. Some argue this is a deliberate decision. Id. Others
argue it is due to a lack of awareness. See Draft Study on Participation, supra note 104, at 4,
11-13.
169. See Kremers, supra note 12, at 55; THE GAP BETWEEN, supra note 87, at 11.
170. See Kremers, supra note 12, at 57; Email from Participant in WIPO IGC, supra note
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member states do not work with NGOs in the IGC more than they
work with NGOs in other committees, despite the NGOs' claim to
represent groups that are not represented by the member states.
171
This lack of interaction may stem from member states' distrust
of IGC-funded NGOs. 172 Legitimacy concerns arise because member
states question the current filtering mechanism, given that no group
has ever been denied accreditation. 173 NGOs also disagree amongst
themselves about which organizations truly represent indigenous
groups' interests. 174 Further, states may perceive NGOs as highly
ideological, with fundamental views contrary to the UN's framework,
let alone the IGC's, making it difficult for member states to work with
them.175
Even if state actors want to consider NGO advocacy, NGOs
may not be effective representatives. 176 There is a concern that NGOs
use the IGC forum to publicize their own activities instead of offering
substantive inputs for the policy debate. 177 Others argue that these
organizations tend to simply oppose proposals rather than present
convincing arguments. 178  These concerns are only exacerbated
because member states do not have to attend pre-session
presentations or read NGO-distributed statements, the only means by
which NGOs can share concrete ideas.
1 79
An additional concern is that not enough NGOs are actively
taking advantage of opportunities to participate in the IGC.180 Some
argue this is because they lack funding, 18' while others suggest this is
partly because the accredited groups lack the technical expertise or
capacity to substantively contribute to the IGC process. 8 2 Thus, NGO
171. Email from Participant in WIPO IGC, supra note 157.
172. See Matthews, The Role, supra note 150, at 1381 ("[W]hether the participation of
international NGOs ... influences policy outcomes is questionable.").
173. See MATTHEWS, supra note 13, at 71.
174. Email from Participant in WIPO IGC, supra note 157.
175. Id. For example, if an NGO represents the belief that the member state is occupying
the lands of indigenous groups, when sovereignty has been defined differently, it becomes more
difficult to work with such organizations from the member state's perspective. Id.
176. See Matthews, The Role, supra note 150, at 1371.
177. See id.
178. See id. at 1381.
179. See COMMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ON THE
PROPOSED STUDY ON THE PARTICIPATION OF OBSERVERS IN THE WORK OF THE WIPO
INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND GENETIC RESOURCES,
TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND FOLKLORE [hereinafter USPTO COMMENTS], available at
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/tken/documents/pdflusa_comments on-observer-participa
tion.pdf.
180. See infra Part II.C.
181. See infra Part II.C.
182. See MATTHEWS, supra note 13, at 71.
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accreditation may add facial legitimacy to the IGC process but may
not promote genuine substantive representation.1 8 3
C. WIPO's Efforts to Increase Participation of Accredited Observers
Only one year after its establishment, the IGC held a series of
regional discussions and education meetings to increase observer
participation.1 8 4 Today, the IGC uses a series of mechanisms to
achieve this goal.185
One of the IGC's first actions to increase observer participation
was to create the fast-track accreditation process, because it
recognized that many stakeholders did not have the
permanent-observer status necessary to participate in the IGC
sessions.18 6 To become an ad hoc observer to the IGC via the
fast-track process, an applicant organization must file an application
directly with the IGC describing its mission and projects and
explaining the specific relevance of intellectual property to its work. 187
At the beginning of every session, the IGC decides what groups will be
added to the accredited observer list.188
In 2004, the IGC decided to precede its sessions with panel
presentations chaired and conducted by representatives of indigenous
groups.18 9  These half-day presentations serve as a source of
information on the experiences, concerns, and aspirations of
indigenous groups concerning the protection, promotion, and
preservation of their traditional knowledge. 190 The panels are not a
formal part of the sessions, but WIPO includes panel summaries in
session reports and online. 191
183. See Matthews, The Role, supra note 150, at 1371.
184. See Kremers, supra note 12, at 59. WIPO has repeatedly acknowledged that
"[i]ndigenous and local communities in particular need to be able to participate, express their
views and have their voices heard in the IGC decision-making process . . . as the outcome will
affect their rights." BACKGROUND BRIEF No. 2, supra note 5, at 2.
185. See infra Part II.C. One other mechanism that is less cited is WIPO's Indigenous
Fellowship Program, which was created in 2009, whereby WIPO selects an "Indigenous Fellow"
to complete certain tasks within the Traditional Knowledge Division for one year.
See WIPO, WIPO Indigenous Fellowship Program, available at http://www.wipo.int/exportf
sites/www/tk/enlindigenous/fellowship/pdflindigenous-fellowship.pdf.
186. See Kremers, supra note 12, at 55-56. This is the same process by which
organizations become ad-hoc observers, as mentioned in Part I. See infra Part I.D.
187. See BACKGROUND BRIEF No. 2, supra note 5, at 3; Accreditation FAQ, supra note 98,
at 3.
188. See Note on Existing Mechanisms, supra note 11, at 2.
189. See MATrHEWS, supra note 13, at 74.
190. See Indigenous and Local Community Experiences, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/
tk/enigc/panels.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2014).
191. See Note on Existing Mechanisms, supra note 11, at 2.
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Another major focus has been the WIPO Voluntary Fund for
Accredited Indigenous Communities (Voluntary Fund), which seeks to
facilitate and increase indigenous groups' participation in the IGC by
funding travel and other incidental expenses associated with
attendance. 192 Attendance costs can be prohibitively expensive for
many, if not the majority, of these groups. 193 Governments, NGOs,
and public entities finance the Voluntary Fund through voluntary
contributions.1 94 The Advisory Board, 195 a rotating committee that the
IGC elects at every session, 196 selects recipients at the margin of the
sessions, 197 administers the Voluntary Fund,1 98 and notifies the
accredited observer at one session if they will be funded for the
subsequent session.1 99 It costs the IGC approximately $18,500 to fund
five organizations. 20 0 The Advisory Board consists of nine members,
three of whom are accredited observers representing indigenous
groups.20 1 Since 2005, the Voluntary Fund has sponsored more than
eighty groups. 
202
192. See Participating in the IGC, supra note 93. Funding generally covers flight
expenses and a daily subsistence allowance at a rate previously determined. See WIPO, BOOKLET
No. 3: A STRONGER VOICE FOR INDIGENOUS AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES IN WIPO's WORK ON
TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE, TRADITIONAL CULTURAL EXPRESSIONS AND GENETIC RESOURCES: THE
WIPO VOLUNTARY FUND 16 [hereinafter VOLUNTARY FUND BOOKLET], available at
http:l/www.wipo.int/freepublications/en/tk/936/wipo-pub-936.pdf. Only accredited observers can
be sponsored under the Voluntary Fund. See id.
193. MATHEWS, supra note 13, at 74.
194. VOLUNTARY FUND BOOKLET, supra note 192, at 12.
195. 'The members of the Advisory Board are elected by the IGC plenary on the proposal
of its Chair. They meet during the IGC session in which they are participating and are required
to conclude their deliberations before the end of the session, when their mandate expires. The
Advisory Board comprises nine members, including: (i) the Chair or one of the Vice-Chairs of the
IGC appointed ex officio; (ii) five members from the delegations of WIPO Member States taking
part in the IGC sessions, reflecting appropriate geographical balance; and (iii) three members
from accredited observers representing indigenous or local communities. The members of the
Advisory Board serve in an individual capacity." Draft Study on Participation, supra note 104, at
7-8.
196. See VOLUNTARY FUND BOOKLET, supra note 192, at 20.
197. See id.
198. See id. at 8.
199. See id. at 14-15.
200. See William New, In "Great Shame," WIPO Fund for Indigenous Peoples'
Participation Running Dry, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WATCH (Apr. 26, 2013, 8:13 AM),
http://www.ip-watch.org/2013/04/26/in-great-shame-wipo-fund-for-indigenous-peoples-
participation-running-dry.
201. See VOLUNTARY FUND BOOKLET, supra note 192, at 20.
202. See BACKGROUND BRIEF NO. 2, supra note 5, at 3; see also VOLUNTARY FUND
BOOKLET, supra note 192, at 8-9 (explaining how Voluntary Fund applicants are reviewed for
eligibility). The Voluntary Fund currently requires the applying accredited organization to
nominate a representative who will attend the relevant IGC session on behalf of the group if
funds are allotted to the applying organization. See WIPO, APPLICATION FORM TO BE SUBMITTED
BY AN APPLICANT WISHING TO RECEIVE SUPPORT FROM THE WIPO' VOLUNTARY FUND FOR
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The IGC has also made efforts to provide information to
indigenous groups in many ways. 20 3 The IGC includes extensive
documentation of its meetings, agendas, panel discussions, and
informational guides on relevant issues, most of which are provided in
six languages on its website. 20 4 WIPO also provides a best-practices
tip sheet for observers to review before they attend a session.20 5 For
IGC sessions, WIPO finances interpretation and translation
support.206 Upon request or on its own accord, the Secretariat also
provides briefings on the work of the IGC to representatives of NGOs
and civil society. 20 7 Also, WIPO has held workshops and lunch
meetings to introduce the topics the IGC addresses.
208
D. WIPO's Efforts Criticized as Insufficient
Despite the IGC's efforts, critics argue that the concerns and
demands of these communities continue to receive insufficient
attention.20 9 Many indigenous groups, as recently as 2012, have
voiced frustration that they do not have a real avenue to participate. 210
Regarding the fast-track accreditation process, scholars like
Kremers worry it remains too time consuming and cumbersome
because of the time lag between the application deadline and the
IGC's decision, which can be as long as one year. 211 The process also
allows member states to block politically unpopular or otherwise
ACCREDITED INDIGENOUS AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES, FOR THE TWENTY-EIGHTH SESSION OF THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND GENETIC RESOURCES,
TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND FOLKLORE 2 [hereinafter VOLUNTARY FUND APPLICATION FORM],
available at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/tk/en/igc/pdf/application form.pdf.
203. See Intergovernmental Committee (IGC), WIPO, http://www.wipo.inttlk/en/igc (last
visited Feb. 9, 2014).
204. See Meetings, supra note 94; Publications, Studies and Documents, WIPO,
http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/resources/publications.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2014).
205. See WIPO INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
GENETIC RESOURCES, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND FOLKLORE: MAKING YOUR INTERVENTION...,
WIPO, available at http://www.wipo.int/exportlsites/www/tk/enigc/pdf/intervention.pdf.
206. See Note on Existing Mechanisms, supra note 11, at 3.
207. See id. at 2.
208. See id. at 3.
209. See MATTHEWS, supra note 13, at 74.
210. See Kaitlin Mara, Indigenous People Seek Recognition at WIPO Meeting on Their
Rights, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WATCH (Oct. 23, 2008, 6:56 PM), http://www.ip-
watch.org/2008/10/23/indigenous-people-seek-recognition-at-wipo-meeting-on-their-rights;
William New, WIPO Members (Again) Intensify Talks on Genetic Material, TK, Folklore,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WATCH (Oct. 7, 2012, 1:32 PM), http://www.ip-watch.org/
2012/10/07/wipo-members-again-intensify-talks-on-genetic-material-tk-folklore.
211. See Kremers, supra note 12, at 55-56; MATTHEWS, supra note 13, at 74.
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undesirable organizations from participating. 212 The latter concern
intensifies as the drafting process becomes more politicized.
213
Scholars criticize the pre-session panels for being merely a
farce to increase indigenous groups' apparent participation without
improving their influence. 214 Some worry that the panel discussions
themselves further sideline the views of these groups since the panels
are not incorporated into the IGC sessions. 215 Many member-state
representatives "often leave the room for most or all of these
presentations" since attendance is not mandatory. 216  Others
emphasize that the NGOs that are likely to speak at these panel
discussions may do so for public-relations purposes rather than to
voice real concerns or propose constructive solutions.
21 7
As for the Voluntary Fund, the IGC can only finance applicants
to the extent that resources allow. 218 Over the past several sessions,
there has been a dramatic decline in contributions, decreasing the
potential effective participation of indigenous groups. 219 WIPO's
Director General, Francis Gurry, commented in July 2013 that the
Voluntary Fund was "bereft of funds" and predicted to run out after
the Twenty-Fourth Session in April 2013.220 This is particularly
troublesome because the sessions have become increasingly about
negotiating the language of the final legal instrument and less about
fact-finding.221 As Debra Harry,222 who presented on behalf of more
than a dozen indigenous organizations at WIPO in 2010, stated, "when
[the Voluntary Fund] shrinks and [WIPO is] only able to support five
212. See Kremers, supra note 12, at 56.
213. See id.
214. Cf. MATTHEWS, supra note 13, at 74.
215. See id.
216. USPTO COMMENTS, supra note 179 ("[Mlany people often leave the room for most or
all of these presentations.").
217. See supra Part II.B.
218. Cf. VOLUNTARY FUND BOOKLET, supra note 192, at 8 (stating that the ICC relies
"exclusively on voluntary contributions by governments, NGOs and other private or public
entities" to finance the Voluntary Fund).
219. See INDIGENOUS PEOPLES COUNCIL ON BIOCOLONIALISM, COMMENTS SUBMITTED BY
THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES COUNCIL ON BIOCOLONIALISM RE: WIPO CIRCULAR C. 8029
(Nov. 30, 2011) [hereinafter IPCB COMMENTS], available at http://www.wipo.int/
export/sites/www/tk/enldocuments/pdf/ipcbcomments on observer participation.pdf.
220. William New, WIPO Scrounges for Funds for Indigenous Participants in Key Treaty
Negotiations, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WATCH (July 15, 2013, 1:36 PM), http://www.ip-
watch.org/2013/07/15/wipo-scrounges-for-funds-for-indigenous-participants-in-key-treaty-
negotiations. WIPO was able to fund four people to attend the Twenty-Fifth Session only because
Australia and New Zealand came to the rescue at the last minute. See id.
221. See id.
222. Debra Harry is a Paiute from Pyramid Lake, Nevada. See Toensing, supra note 8.
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Indigenous People from around the world to attend, that's hardly fair
representation of the world['s] ... Indigenous Peoples. 223
The Voluntary Fund's Advisory Board also faces criticism
because it allegedly does not pay much attention to the selection or
fundraising processes. 224 This criticism stems from the fact that the
Board meets at the margins of sessions, which limits the time they
spend on Voluntary Fund deliberations. 225
Although it is commendable that WIPO provides informational
support and posts all documents online, the website is not
user-friendly, which is especially troubling for groups that may have
limited access to mentors or information for further guidance. 226 Also,
the IGC-sponsored lunch meetings, which many member states and
observers claimed were helpful, no longer occur.227
E. Institutional Efforts to Improve Observer Participation
As recently as 2012, the IGC has sought suggestions from its
member states and accredited observers to increase and facilitate
indigenous groups' participation. 228
223. Id.
224. See Draft Study on Participation, supra note 104, at 9.
225. See id.
226. See USPTO COMMENTS, supra note 179. While preparing this Note for publication,
WIPO has begun phasing-in a new website. See Coming Next Week - A New WIPO Website,
WIPO: NEWS ARCHIVE 2013 (Oct. 29, 2013), http://www.wipo.int/portal/en/news/
2013/article_0044.html.
227. See Note on Existing Mechanisms, supra note 11, at 3 ("[1]n the earlier years of the
IGC, the Secretariat provided a briefing for observers during the lunch-break on the first day of
each session. As attendance at such briefings waned, perhaps because observers became more
familiar with the IGC process, these briefings were discontinued in 2009."); see also TRADITIONS
FOR TOMORROW, OBSERVATIONS OF TRADITIONS FOR TOMORROW CONCERNING THE STUDY
PROVIDED ON THE PARTICIPATION OF OBSERVERS IN THE WORK OF THE WIPO
INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND GENETIC RESOURCES,
TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND FOLKLORE (IGC) 2 (Dec. 2, 2011)
[hereinafter TRADITIONS FOR TOMORROW COMMENT ON NOTE], available at http://www.wipo.intl
export/sites/www/tklendocuments/pdftraditions-pour demain comments on observer participa
tion.pdf (suggesting the IGC reinstate lunch meetings).
228. See infra Part II.E.
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1. The Secretariat's Note
In October 2011, the WIPO Secretariat issued the "Note on
Existing Mechanisms for Participation of Observers in the Work of the
WIPO IGC" (Secretariat's Note), which outlined WIPO's then-current
practices to facilitate observer participation and sought feedback to
enhance observer contribution.229 Six countries and ten accredited
observers responded. 230
2. Responses to the Secretariat's Note
Many respondents called for the expansion of the Voluntary
Fund's financial and administrative capacity and sources of
funding. 231  Some suggestions for achieving these goals included
replacing the current rotating-Advisory Board model with a more
stable, 232 term-based system and using other UN bodies as models for
restructuring the Advisory Board to include more indigenous
representatives. 233 Alternatively, the United States suggested the
IGC explore remote participation to increase involvement without
disturbing the Voluntary Fund.
23 4
229. See Note on Existing Mechanisms, supra note 11, at 1. Member states and
accredited observers were invited to respond to three overarching questions: 1) "Is there any
existing mechanism or practice to facilitate direct participation of observers in the work of the
IGC or to strengthen their capacity to contribute to the process that has not been reflected
above?" 2) "What are the options for enhancing the existing mechanisms and practices?" 3)
"What draft recommendations should the twentieth session of the IGC consider with a view to
enhancing the positive contribution of observers to the work of the IGC?" See id. at 1, 3.
230. See Draft Study on Participation, supra note 104, at 1-2. The following countries
filed comments to the Secretariat's Note: The United States; Pakistan; Mexico; Kazakstan; The
Russian Federation; Colombia. Id. at 1 n.3. The following accredited observers filed comments to
the Secretariat's Note: Association of Students and Researchers on the Governance of Island
States (AECG); Foundation for Aboriginal and Islander Research Action (FAIRA); Grand Council
of the Crees (Eeyou Istchee); Indigenous People (Bethechilokono) of Saint Lucia Governing
Council (BCG); Indigenous Peoples Council of Biocolonialism (IPCB); Intangible Cultural
Heritage Network (Ichnet); Kanuri Development Association; Traditions for Tomorrow; Tupaj
Amaru Indigenous Movement; United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights (OHCHR). Id. at 2 n.4.
231. See id. at 8.
232. See id. at 7-8; FOUND. FOR ABORIGINAL & ISLANDER RESEARCH ACTION [FAIRA],
SUBMISSION TO THE WIPO SECRETARIAT ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES EFFECTIVE PARTICIPATION IN
WIPO IGC ON GRTKF [hereinafter FAIRA SUBMISSION], available at
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/tk/en/documents/pdf/faira-comments-on-observer_particip
ation.pdf.
233. See Draft Study on Participation, supra note 104, at 8. For instance, the Executive
Secretary of the CBD has an Advisory Selection Committee that meets remotely and consults
with a committee of representatives from seven socio-cultural regions recognized by the UNPFII.
See id.
234. See USPTO COMMENTS, supra note 179.
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Many who commented on the Secretariat's Note were also
dissatisfied with how the IGC transmits observers' expertise to
member states at the IGC sessions. 235 Mexico suggested each member
state include in its delegation an indigenous representative lawfully
elected by the indigenous peoples and communities of that country to
incorporate their points of view. 236 One of the commenting observers,
The Tradition for Tomorrow, called for exchange sessions between
states and observers and suggested the IGC reinstate lunch
meetings.
237
The commenters also suggested ways to increase the
involvement of currently accredited observers. 238 One commentator,
the Indigenous Peoples Council on Biocolonialism, suggested that the
IGC place observers on more equal footing with states by allowing
them to present texts at IGC sessions. 239 Similarly, FAIRA, an
accredited observer, suggested the IGC accept indigenous peoples'
delegations into drafting groups.240
To assuage the concern about the legitimacy or
representativeness of the current observers, the commenters proposed
changes to the accreditation process. 241 For instance, Mexico proposed
analyzing whether the currently accredited observers participating in
the IGC sessions "are sufficiently representative" of the communities
they claim to represent and whether they are reporting back to the
indigenous communities to clarify the relationships of the accredited
organizations with the indigenous communities. 242
235. See id.; Draft Study on Participation, supra note 104, at 10-11.
236. See COMMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF MEXICO ON EXISTING MECHANISMS FOR
PARTICIPATION OF OBSERVERS IN THE WORK OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, GENETIC RESOURCES, TRADITIONAL
KNOWLEDGE AND FOLKLORE (IGC) [hereinafter MEX. COMMENT ON NOTE], available at
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/tk/en/documents/pdf/mexico-comments-on-observer-parti
cipation.pdf.
237. TRADITIONS FOR TOMORROW COMMENT ON NOTE, supra note 227, at 2.
238. See Draft Study on Participation, supra note 104, at 10-11.
239. See IPCB COMMENTS, supra note 219.
240. See FAIRA SUBMISSION, supra note 232. In the Secretariat's Draft Study on
Participation, as addressed in Part II.E.2, the Secretariat contributed to this suggestion and
presented examples from other UN bodies like the CBD, which allow working groups to be
co-chaired by a representative proposed by the indigenous and local community organizations
present at a given meeting. See Draft Study on Participation, supra note 104, at 12.
241. See Draft Study on Participation, supra note 104, at 3-5.
242. See MEX. COMMENT ON NOTE, supra note 236. The Secretariat echoed this sentiment
in its Draft Study on Participation, suggesting the fast-track accreditation process be adjusted to
make a distinction between those applicants who represent and are accountable to indigenous
groups from those organizations that claim to represent their viewpoints through a standing
accreditation advisory mechanism. See Draft Study on Participation, supra note 104, at 5. This
would be helpful for identifying which indigenous peoples and local communities should be
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To facilitate dialogue and indigenous groups' preparedness for
the sessions, some commenters suggested mechanisms to improve
access to information.2 43 For example, some suggested WIPO improve
the WIPO and IGC websites 244 or to at least provide a supplementary
guide to explain how to use the current websites. 245  Another
suggestion was to expand the mediums of information to publicly




In response to these suggestions, WIPO published the "Draft
Study on the Participation of Observers in the WIPO IGC" (Draft
Study) in February 2012 that narrowed the aforementioned described
suggestions to nine proposals.2 47 The IGC discussed those proposals at
the Twentieth Session and requested that the Secretariat draft
another document reviewing three of them. 248 At the subsequent
beneficiaries of Voluntary Fund monies, who should be invited to participate in panel
discussions, and who should be considered for delegations. See id.
243. See Draft Study on Participation, supra note 104, at 12.
244. See USPTO COMMENTS, supra note 179.
245. See RUSSIAN FEDERATION, RE: CIRCULAR LETTER C.8029, available at
http:/www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/tk/en/documents/pdf/russian-federation-comments-on-obs
erver-participation.pdf.
246. See USPTO COMMENTS, supra note 179.
247. See Draft Study on Participation, supra note 104, at 13-16. The proposals were
stated as follows: "Proposal 1: Clarifying relationship with diverse categories of observers";
"Proposal 2: Cooperating in a spirit of partnership"; "Proposal 3: Substantiating policy debate
through enhanced engagement"; "Proposal 4: Facilitating coordinated expert advice and input";
"Proposal 5: Enhancing national and regional dialogue and awareness-raising'; "Proposal 6:
Fortifying financial and other means of support for direct participation"; "Proposal 7: Expanding
interaction through information exchange"; "Proposal 8: Awareness-raising and communications
tools"; "Proposal 9: Strengthening cooperation with other United Nations bodies, programs and
agencies). Id. at 13-16.
248. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMM. ON INTELL. PROP. & GENETIC RES., TRADITIONAL
KNOWLEDGE & FOLKLORE, WIPO., SESSION No. 20, DRAFT REPORT (2012) [hereinafter
TWENTIETH SESSION DRAFT REPORT], available at http:l/www.wipo.intedocs/mdocs/
tklenlwipo-grtkf ic 21/wipo-grtkf ic 21 ref-grtkf_20_10_prov.pdf. The three proposals were:
Proposal 1 (regarding revision of the application form for ad hoc accreditation to the IGC and the
establishment of a standing advisory mechanism on accreditation applications), Proposal 3
(regarding revisions to the format of the Indigenous Panel) and Proposal 6 (regarding
establishment of a standing Advisory Board for the WIPO Voluntary Fund for Accredited
Indigenous and Local Communities). See id. The Secretariat appeared willing to entertain
Proposal 1 and Proposal 3, but wanted to maintain the status quo as per Proposal 6. See
INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMM. ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. & GENETIC RES., TRADITIONAL
KNOWLEDGE & FOLKLORE, WIPO, SESSION No. 21, PARTICIPATION OF OBSERVERS (2012),
available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/tk/enwipo-grtkf-ic-21/wipo grtkf-ic 21-6.pdf.
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session, the IGC did not adopt any of these three proposals. 249 As for
the other six proposals, the Committee supported and encouraged
many of them. 250 Some have even prompted action. 251 For example,
one proposal was to facilitate expert advice and input through a
workshop, and in response to it, in April 2013 the WIPO Secretariat
and the UNPFII Secretariat organized an "Indigenous Expert
Workshop on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional
Knowledge and Traditional Cultural Expressions." 252  In the Draft
Study, the Secretariat also explained that there are two best-case-
scenario alternatives for increasing indigenous groups' participation:
give indigenous groups (1) the right to vote or (2) the right to make
proposals, motions, and amendments.2 53 Nevertheless, discussions
raged on regarding how the IGC could increase indigenous groups'
influence and participation.
2 54
4. Indigenous Proposals at Twenty-First IGC Session
At the Twenty-First Session, the Indigenous Caucus, with
Mexico's sponsorship, presented another set of suggestions:
(1) [A] new status being that of Indigenous Peoples, separate from observers, be
established within the Committee, 2 5 5 (2) indigenous peoples be represented ... within
249. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMM. ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. & GENETIC RES.,
TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE & FOLKLORE, WIPO, SESSION No. 21, DRAFT REPORT (2012), available
at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/tk/en/wipo-grtkf-ic-23/wipo-grtkf-ic-23-ref-grtkf 21 7
prov_2.pdf.
250. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMM. ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. & GENETIC RES.,
TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE & FOLKLORE, WIPO, SESSION No. 20, REPORT (2012), available
at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/tk/en/wipo-grtkf ic 21/wipo-grtkfic 21_ref-grtkf_20_10.pdf.
The Committee "strongly encouraged" that member states organize regional and national
consultations, agreed that the website needed to become more user-friendly and suggested
observers submit comments online for member states to view, and welcomed the continued
cooperation of the WIPO Secretariat and other UN bodies and intergovernmental bodies. See id.
251. See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMM. ON INTELL. PROP. & GENETIC RES.,
TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE & FOLKLORE, WIPO, SESSION NO. 25, Report of Indigenous Expert
Workshop on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and
Traditional Cultural Expressions, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/25/INF/9 (2013), available at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/tken/wipo-grtkf ic 25/wipo-grtkf ic_25_inf_9.pdf.
252. Id. at 1. The Secretariat stated the workshop was developed as a result of a proposal
in the Draft Study. Id.
253. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMM. ON INTELL. PROP. & GENETIC RES., TRADITIONAL
KNOWLEDGE & FOLKLORE, WIPO, SESSION NO. 22, Participation of Observers,
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/22/INF/10 (2012) [hereinafter SESSION No. 22, Participation of Observers],
available at http://www.wipo.intledocs/mdocs/tk/enwipo-grtkf-ic-22/wipo-grtkf ic22 inf
10.pdf.
254. See supra Part II.E.3.
255. The proposed new participant category would allow indigenous groups and local
communities to submit proposals, amendments and motions. THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES CAUCUS
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any "Friends of the Chair" groups that may be established from time to time, (3)
representatives of indigenous peoples be... appointed as co-chairs of working and
drafting groups, (4) equal representation with Member States on the Advisory Board of
the WIPO Voluntary Fund... (5) the Secretariat consult with the Chair of the
Indigenous Caucus, intersessionally, regarding selection of panelists for the Indigenous
Panel, and (6) panelists of the Indigenous Panel be invited to address the substantive
working documents of the Committee session concerned in order to contribute directly to
the development of the work of the IGC .... 256
These suggestions prompted the Secretariat to create a
document describing the practical, procedural, and budgetary
implications thereof.257 At the Twenty-Second IGC session, the IGC
discussed these implications, but took no action regarding them.
258
There have been no further discussions regarding potential solutions
aside from talks about the Voluntary Fund's survival.
259
III. BALANCING REALITY AND ASPIRATIONS
There is little doubt that indigenous groups face an uphill
battle to increase their role in the IGC because of the institutional,
financial, and political challenges they face.260  WIPO is a
member-centric body, where member states have the power to include
or exclude groups and perspectives as they see fit.261 While members
consider UN principles and their respective public images, they are
not likely to sacrifice their interests easily.
262
Nevertheless, the IGC is in a particularly unique position
because the instrument(s) it is drafting will affect individuals who are
AT THE IGC-22 POSITION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES PARTICIPATION, (2012), available at
http://www.docip.org/fileadminluser-upload/ENG-WIPO-IPStatementllO712-signed.pdf.
256. SESSION No. 22, Participation of Observers, supra note 253.
257. See generally id.
258. INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMM. ON INTELL. PROP. & GENETIC RES., TRADITIONAL
KNOWLEDGE & FOLKLORE, WIPO, SESSION No. 22, Decisions of the Twenty-Second Session of the
Committee (2012), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/tk/en/wipo-grtkf ic_22/
wipo-grtkf ic_22 ref decisions.pdf.
259. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMM. ON INTELL. PROP. & GENETIC RES., TRADITIONAL
KNOWLEDGE & FOLKLORE, WIPO, SESSION No. 23, Draft Report, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/23/8 (2013),
available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/tk/en/wipo-grtkf ic 23/wipoogrtkf ic 23_8_
prov_2.pdf; INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMM. ON INTELL. PROP. & GENETIC RES., TRADITIONAL
KNOWLEDGE & FOLKLORE, WIPO, SESSION NO. 24, Report, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/24/8 (2013),
available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/tk/en/wipo-grtkf-ic-24/wipo-grtkf ic 24_8.pdf;
INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMM. ON INTELL. PROP. & GENETIC RES., TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE &
FOLKLORE, WIPO, SESSION NO. 24, Decisions of the Twenty-Fifth Session
of the Committee, (2013), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/tkenwipo-grtkf ic_25/
wipo-grtkf ic 25_ref decisions.pdf.
260. See supra Part II.B.
261. See supra Part I.D.
262. Cf. supra Part II.B.1 (illustrating that not all member states are amenable to
indigenous groups' needs and perspectives).
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not necessarily represented at the negotiating table.26 3 Thus, the IGC
should take steps to involve more sufficiently representative
indigenous groups and employ mechanisms to allow these
representatives to influence the final instrument(s).26 4 The means to
achieve these objectives are proposed in this section with the realities
of the day and the underlying principles of self-determination and
human rights in mind.26 5 The purpose of this section is to present
solutions that are pragmatic and potentially viable.
A key problem facing the IGC is that it is unclear who is
representing indigenous groups' interests at IGC sessions.266 This is
especially true for indigenous groups that have strained relationships
with their governments or have yet to develop rapport with their
governing nation state.267 Adding to the confusion is the fact that the
IGC does not distinguish between accredited observers that directly
represent indigenous groups and those that represent other
interests.268 Thus, the voices from those organizations that do have
the requisite authority and legitimacy are muddied.269
To confront these concerns, the IGC must ensure that
representative indigenous groups attend and participate in the IGC
sessions. 270 Member states are more likely to take indigenous groups'
ideas seriously if they come from a group of representative and
qualified individuals.2 71 As an initial step, the IGC should confirm that
the currently accredited organizations that claim to represent
indigenous groups are sufficiently representative and that their
claimed constituents have given them the requisite authority to
represent them.2
72
The accreditation process must also be improved because there
is currently no real barrier to becoming an accredited observer. 273
263. See supra Part II.A.
264. See supra Part II.E.
265. Cf. supra Parts I.A & II.C.
266. See supra Part II.B.
267. See supra Part II.B.
268. See supra Part II.B.2.
269. See supra Part II.B.2.
270. See supra Part 1I.B.2.
271. See supra Part I1B..1.
272. Cf. MEX. COMMENT ON NOTE, supra note 236 (suggesting the IGC review currently
accredited observers). WIPO should create a mechanism for determining when an organization is
"sufficiently representative." Cf. Hugo Slim, GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH CENTER, By What
Authority? The Legitimacy and Accountability of Non-governmental Organisations (2002),
available at http://www.gdrc.org/ngo/accountabilitylby-what-authority.html. This may be a
difficult task given the lack of common vocabulary and consensus regarding who "owns"
traditional knowledge. See, e.g., KONGOLO, supra note 38, at 39.
273. See supra Part II.B.2.
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This may give member states the impression that observers have
either not been properly vetted to speak on any group's behalf or have
strong lobbying interests.274 Thus, the IGC should create a more
nuanced and sophisticated accreditation form that makes it more
difficult to obtain accreditation, as suggested in 2012.275 One way of
doing this is to have the IGC require an applicant to provide a form of
authorization from the claimed constituent group. 276 Further, the IGC
should create a distinction between accredited observers that claim to
represent particular indigenous groups and those that represent other
interests to reduce any potential for confusion.277 If an applicant-NGO
does not claim to represent any particular groups' interests, then this
additional proof should not be required.
278
Even under the IGC's current mechanisms to increase
participation at the IGC sessions, an improved verification system will
not be useful to indigenous groups if the representative individuals
cannot attend the IGC sessions.279 Consequently, the IGC must
address the constant and real challenge of the Voluntary Fund's
diminishing resources and pursue innovative ways to educate and
inform indigenous groups about the IGC's work.
280
First, WIPO and the IGC should encourage outside
benefactors, such as corporations and law firms, to donate to the
Voluntary Fund.281 The benefits of having corporate sponsors is
evidenced by the success of other UN organizations that have taken
advantage of the corporate world's growing interest in gaining
consumer goodwill, brand differentiation, and enhanced employee
engagement through donations to important causes.28 2 Private actors
274. See supra Part II.B.2.
275. See TWENTIETH SESSION DRAFT REPORT, supra note 248. But see Observers, supra
note 10 (demonstrating that WIPO distinguishes between types of applicants and has more
sophisticated application procedures for permanent-observer accreditation).
276. Neither the current accreditation form nor the applicant form to request funds from
the Voluntary Fund require any additional verification or background information to confirm
that the organization does truly represent the claimed groups' interests. See WIPO, RE.:
REQUEST FOR ACCREDITATION AS AN OBSERVER IN FUTURE SESSIONS OF THE WIPO, available at
http://www.wipo.int/export/siteslwww/tk/en/igc/pdf/igc-accreditation-form.pdf; VOLUNTARY FUND
APPLICATION FORM, supra note 202.
277. See supra Part II.B.2.
278. See supra Part II.B.2.
279. See supra Part I.B.2.
280. See supra Part II.D.
281. See supra Part II.C.
282. For example, UNICEF received 74% of its fiscal revenue, amounting to almost $12
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may find these benefits outweigh the approximately $3,700 price tag
to finance a Voluntary Fund applicant. 2
8 3
Further, the Advisory Board should also begin to focus on
acquiring sponsors that are willing to make in-kind service
contributions, in addition to or instead of monetary contributors. 28 4
For example, the Advisory Board could reach out to international
airline companies and ask them to provide free transportation or
subsidized pricing to help indigenous groups get to the IGC
meetings. 28
5
If the Voluntary Fund is not a helpful mechanism for
increasing participation, then WIPO needs to consider other means of
participation. 28 6 One suggested route is to require member states to
meet with indigenous groups domestically and come to the IGC
sessions with their proposals. 28 7 This could facilitate more exchanges
between member states and indigenous groups, even if many groups
are unable to attend.288 Another suggestion is to have the member
states sponsor an indigenous-group representative who is elected
democratically from the member state's caucus of groups. 28 9 It would
then become the state's burden to sponsor a representative, which
may make them more likely to engage in dialogue. 290 Admittedly, this
second solution may be quite difficult to implement since many
member states seem unable or unwilling to help finance the Fund;
however, if certain developed countries-like the United States,
Australia, and New Zealand-embark on this kind of sponsoring,
others may follow suit.291 If not by voluntary means, then it may be
worth pressuring the General Assembly to amend the Voluntary
283. See New, supra note 200.
284. Many companies contribute services in addition to funds through their corporate
social-responsibility efforts. For instance, FedEx recently donated $100,000 in transportation
services to get supplies and donations to Hurricane Sandy victims. FedEx Provides Support to
Hurricane Sandy Relief, DIRECT RELIEF (Nov. 1, 2012), http://www.directrelief.org/2012/11/fedex-
provide-support-hurricane-sandy-relief [hereinafter FedEx Provides Support]. UPS has provided
similar assistance. Ken Sternad, Disaster Relief- Why Corporations Need to Give More
Than Cash, UPSIDE: THE UPS BLOG (Feb. 8, 2010), http:/blog.ups.com/2010/02/08/disaster-relief-
why-corporations-need-to-give -more-than-cash.
285. Cf. FedEx Provides Support, supra note 284 (FedEx provided cash and in-kind
transportation services to Hurricane Sandy relief efforts); Sternad, supra note 284 (explaining
why corporations should donate more than just money to disaster relief efforts).
286. See supra Part II.E.2.
287. See supra Part II.E.2.
288. See supra Parts II.B.1 & II.E.
289. See supra Part II.E.2.
290. Cf. supra Part II.E.2 (exploring suggestions for increasing the representativeness
and legitimacy of observers).
291. See supra Part II.D.
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Fund's rules to allow the WIPO budget to contribute to the Fund.292
As a last resort, WIPO should consider how the United States' remote
participation idea can be implemented.
293
Even if the sufficiently representative groups are able to attend
the IGC sessions or other means are created for their virtual
attendance, their presence alone does not necessarily translate into
influence. 294 Therefore, the IGC must make structural changes to
remove some of the institutional barriers that prevent indigenous
groups from participating and wielding influence. 295 Some structural
changes, such as giving indigenous groups voting power or allowing
them to make proposals or motions, require an amendment to WIPO's
General Rules of Procedure whereas other changes can arise from
member-state delegations submitting proposals to the IGC for
approval. 2
96
In the short term, there are some preliminary structural
changes that could increase participation. For instance, the
pre-session panels can be made mandatory, which would force
member states to listen, at the very least, to accredited observers'
perspectives on the relevant issues.291 Another small but possibly
worthwhile action for the IGC to take would be to reinstate lunch
meetings, which member states and indigenous groups found
particularly useful when they took place in the past.298  If the
interaction between indigenous groups and member states increases,
even within the confines of the IGC's current structure, then there is
great potential for indigenous groups to influence the final
instrument(s) .299
In terms of long-term structural goals, the Secretariat
explained in its Draft Study on Participation that there are two
best-case-scenario alternatives: give indigenous groups (1) the right to
292. See New, supra note 200.
293. See supra Part JI.E.2.
294. See supra Part II.D.
295. See supra Part I.D.
296. The IGC adopted WIPO's General Rules of Procedure in 2001 and continues to use
these rules. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMM. ON INTELL. PROP. & GENETIC RES., TRADITIONAL
KNOWLEDGE & FOLKLORE, WIPO, SESSION NO. 1, at 2, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/1/2 (2001);
WIPO, WIPO's General Rules of Procedure, available at http://www.wipo.intl
freepublications/enlgeneral/399/wipo pub_399.html#rule2l. However, member state ideas have
been implemented via approval from the IGC. See Note on Existing Mechanisms, supra note 11,
at 2 (discussing New Zealand's proposal for pre-session panels and the IGC's adoption of that
proposal).
297. See supra Part II.D.
298. See supra Parts II.D & II.E.2.
299. See supra Part II.A. 1.
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vote or (2) the right to make proposals, motions, and amendments. 300
The latter is preferable for several reasons. First, the ability to
present ideas to drafting groups or to the IGC may spark dialogue,
allow relationships to develop, and increase the likelihood of
incorporating their ideas into the final document(s).301 Second, while
voting carries important symbolic significance, it has few practical
benefits in the WIPO context: indigenous groups would likely be
outvoted or never vote because WIPO acts primarily through
consensus and avoids voting.30 2  Indigenous-group representatives
should be able to participate in drafting groups directly or hold
separate sessions where they can develop their ideas and later present
them to the IGC.30 3 The workshop recently organized by the IGC and
UNPFII is a great start to initiate the latter.
30 4
WIPO should also focus on improving and expanding the
sources of information currently available. 30 5 To start, WIPO should
make its website more user-friendly. 306 The website should serve as a
source for any group that wants to participate to easily understand
the trajectory of events that have taken place and the issues at
stake.30 7 Further, the IGC should explore other ways to reach out
besides the Internet since many indigenous groups may lack access to
such technology.308 For instance, the IGC may seek to embark on an
informational mission, similar to the missions that WIPO initiated in
the 1990s, to initiate dialogue between member states and indigenous
groups. 30
9
The IGC should ultimately focus on ensuring that those who
will be affected by the final instrument(s) are present, informed, and
involved in the IGC's process in ways that allow them to make an
impact. Potential solutions exist-all that is necessary is action.310
300. See SESSION No. 22; Participation of Observers, supra note 253.
301. Cf. supra Part II.B.1 (explaining how relationships between member states and
indigenous groups may be underdeveloped or strained).
302. See supra Part I.B.
303. See supra Part II.E.2.
304. See supra Part II.E.3.
305. See supra Part II.E.2.
306. See supra Part II.E.2.
307. See supra Part II.D.
308. See supra Part I.C.
309. See supra Part I.C.




WIPO's IGC faces a difficult task: develop an international
legal instrument or set of agreements for the effective protection of
TK, TCE, and GR. But, the limited participation of indigenous groups
threatens the final product's legitimacy and may sacrifice UN
principles regarding self-determination and human rights. Although
the IGC has acknowledged several potential solutions, member states
hold the key to solving this problem by turning their
acknowledgement into action. If this does not occur, the IGC could fail
miserably at its task by allocating intellectual property rights without
consulting the very people whose rights are at stake.
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